[1]姜 帅,龙 静.高管股权激励影响企业技术创新的机制路径分析——基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2022,(03):96-106.
　JIANG Shuai,LONG Jing.The Mechanism Path of Executive Equity Incentive's Impact on Technological Innovation——Based on the Empirical Evidence of China's Private Listed Companies[J].,2022,(03):96-106.
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高管股权激励影响企业技术创新的机制路径分析——基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据()
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《江西师范大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2022年03期
页码:
96-106
栏目:
经济学
出版日期:
2022-05-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Mechanism Path of Executive Equity Incentive's Impact on Technological Innovation——Based on the Empirical Evidence of China's Private Listed Companies
文章编号:
1000-579(2022)03-0096-11
作者:
姜 帅;  龙 静
南京大学 商学院,江苏 南京 210009
Author(s):
JIANG Shuai;  LONG Jing
School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210009,China
关键词:
股权激励;  技术创新;  风险承担;  融资约束;  PSM-DID
Keywords:
equity incentive;  technological innovation;  risk taking;  financing constraints;  PSM-DID
分类号:
F264
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
按照“股权激励——决策行为——决策结果”的逻辑思路,采用2009-2020年中国A股民营上市公司数据,运用PSM-DID方法、中介效应模型等,系统研究了实施高管股权激励对企业技术创新影响的机制路径。研究发现,股权激励通过增强高管风险承担意愿,减轻管理层短视,使得企业“愿意”开展风险性的技术创新活动。股权激励传递出缓解企业委托代理问题,追求企业长远发展的积极信号,有利于企业获得外部融资支持,有效缓解企业的融资约束,使得企业“能够”开展技术创新。来自于银行等债权方的“激励与约束机制”对企业信贷资金获得情况有显著影响,具体表现为实施高管股权激励的企业在下一年获得了更多的信贷资金支持,但资金结构以短期资金为主。
Abstract:
According to the logic of “equity incentive——decision behavior——decision result”,this paper systematically studies the mechanism path of executive equity incentive's impact on technological innovation by using the data of China's A-share private listed companies from 2009 to 2020,PSM-DID method,mediating effect model,etc.It is found that equity incentive can enhance executives' willingness to take risks and reduce management myopia,so that enterprises are “willing” to carry out risky technological innovation activities.In addition,equity incentive sends a positive signal of alleviating the principal-agent problem of enterprises and pursuing long-term development of enterprises,which is conducive to obtaining external financing support,effectively alleviating the financing constraints of enterprises,and enabling enterprises to carry out technological innovation.Further analysis shows that the “incentive and constraint mechanism” from banks and other creditors has a significant impact on the access of corporate credit funds.Specifically,the enterprises implementing executive equity incentive get more credit fund support in the next year,but the capital structure is mainly short-term funds.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2021-12-10
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“个体认知、团队动态对创业机会识别的影响:基于新颖性和有用性权衡的视角”(编号:716720802); 国家自然科学基金项目“‘德不配位'与‘怀才不遇':地位不一致情境下创业团队成员的应对行为及其匹配对创新绩效的影响”(编号:72072086)
作者简介:姜 帅(1985-),女,辽宁鞍山人,经济学博士,南京大学商学院博士后、副研究员。研究方向为公司财务、金融投资与经济统计。
龙 静(1974-),女,四川成都人,南京大学商学院教授、博士生导师。研究方向为战略管理(知识、学习与核心能力、创新战略)、组织理论。
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-03-25