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《江西师范大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:

期数:

2013年02期

页码:

51-56

栏目:

出版日期:

2013-03-01

文章信息/Info

Title:

On the Moral Value of Luck——Similarities and Differences between Williams and Nagel' s Theory of Moral Luck

作者:

曲蓉;

宁波大学 马克思主义学院,浙江 宁波,315211

Author(s):

QU Rong

关键词:

道德运气; 道德评价; 意志自由; 道德与非道德

Keywords:

moral luck;  moral judgment;  free will;  moral and non-moral

分类号:

B82-09

文献标志码:

A

摘要:

道德运气属于一种不受意志支配或至少部分不受意志影响的偶然性因素,它对道德评价的倾向、道德责任的归属以及道德价值的实现具有重要影响。威廉斯从行动者自身的合理性证明角度论证了道德运气的意义,内格尔则从道德评价的一般性条件中得出运气的价值。两位思想家通过道德运气的概念挑战了康德关于意志自由、责任条件和道德限度等方面的基本观点,也揭示了我们关于这些道德根本问题的通常观点存在着诸多不连贯和不一致的方面。这也证明了运气的道德价值。

Abstract:

The moral luck is the accidental factor which is not subject to the will,or at least in part not under the influence of the will.It has an important influence on the moral judgment inclination,attribution of moral responsibility,and realization of moral values.Williams demonstrates the significance of the moral luck from the perspective of the rationality of the actors themselves,and Nagel demonstrates it by finding the general conditions of moral judgment.These two thinkers challenge Kant's basic views about the free will,the conditions of liability and moral limits by the concept of moral luck,and reveal that there are many incoherent and inconsistent aspects about the general views of the fundamental moral problems,which also proves the moral value of luck.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:

国家科技部软科学重大招标项目“城乡统筹与农村生活形态变化研究”成果(编号:2010GXS1D094)

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更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01